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IN THE SUPREME COURT
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STATE OF UTAH
VERNON J. SMITH,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
Case
No.

vs.
WILMER LEE BARNETT,
Defendant and Respondent

10,320

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE
This action was brought by the plaintiff to recover for personal injury damages allegedly caused
by the defendant when struck by the defendant's
car while crossing Rainbow Drive in Murray, Utah.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried before a jury, which brought
in a verdict of "no cause of action." The plaintiff
moved for a new trial, which motion was denied.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks an affirmance of the verdict
of "no cause of action" and the denial of the new
tl'ial.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The accident which gave rise to this suit occurred on December 29, 1962 at 6 :15 P. M. at the
intersection of Rainbow Drive and State Street in
Murray, Utah. Rainbow Drive runs east from State
Street, and State Street runs north and south. The
Montek Building, which includes the plaintiff's business, Towne and Country Rambler, in the southern
half of the building, is located on the southeast
corner. There are two entrances to Towne and
Country Rambler, one in the rear of the building and
one in the front. The northern half of the building
is occupied by the Montek Corporation. The sidewalk
in front of the Montek Building on the east side
of State Street is 12 feet 5 inches wide. On the
northeast corner of the intersection is the Cumberland Motor Co., a service station which has an abandoned gas pump island and used cars sitting along
the State Street side. A sidewalk runs north and
south along the east side of State Street. There is
a stop sign and a utility pole on the northeast corner.
It was dark (R. 119) and the road was dry.
The defendant was driving south on State Street,
which is composed of three lanes for traffic in each
direction, on the inside lane. His lights were on
( R. 275). As he approached Rainbow Drive he entered the left turn lane ( R. 27 5) , looked east at
Rainbow Drive and saw no one (R. 279), then looked
at approaching traffic, hesitated for one car to pass
( R. 27 5), looked east again ( R. 280) and made a

left turn into Rainbow Drive. \Vhen he was about
15 feet east of the west edge or front of the Montek
Building ( R. 276) the defendant saw a dark object
rise up in front of him and sit on the hood (R. 276).
The defendant was driving with his foot on the
brake pedal ( R. 282) and he stopped within two to
three feet ( R. 282). His speed was between 5 and
10 miles per hour (R. 281-282). The defendant
found the plaintiff lying 5 feet directly east of the
defendant's car (R. 113). The front of defendant's
ca1· was 26 feet 3 inches east of the easterly edge
of State Street and 15 feet 7 inches east of the
assumed center of an unmarked crosswalk across
Rainbow Drive. There was a dent left of center on
the driver's side of defendant's car ( R. 281). The
center of the plaintiff was 10 feet 11 inches north
of the curb on the south side of Rainbow Drive and
24 feet 8 inches south of the north curb. The distance
from the center of the left turn lane on State Street
to the easterly edge of the unmarked crosswalk is
86 feet 6 inches. The distance from the utility pole
on the northeast corner to the dent on the car was
26 feet.
There were no lights on in the Montek Building
(R. 274) and the nearest street lights are one on the
east side of State Street 100 feet south of Rainbow
Drive one on the east side of State Street 100 feet
'
north of Rainbow Drive, and one 150 feet west
of the intersection of State Street and Rainbow
Drive ( R. 115). The nearest light on Rainbow Drive
3

was one block east, at the intersection of that street
and Brown Street ( R. 123).
The plaintiff is part owner and manager of
Towne and Country Rambler. He testified that he
was walking back from a visit to Zion Motors, which
is located on the west side of State Street about onefourth of a block north of Rainbow Drive. He was
dressed in a dark suit. He had crossed over State
Street and walked south on the sidewalk on the
east side of State Street, to the northeast corner of
the intersection of Rainbow Drive and State Street.
He asserts he looked up Rainbow Drive, looked south
on State Street, then looked to the right at the left
turn lane on State Street where he saw no cars, and
then proceeded across Rainbow Drive (R. 195-196).
When he was two-thirds of the way across he became
aware of car lights. He shouted, and then was hit
( R. 196). The plaintiff did not look back at the left
turn lane on State Street after he stepped off the
north curb (R. 118). He was looking at the traffic
on State Street coming north (R. 118). He did not
see the defendant until just before he was hit.
The plaintiff claims to have suffered a large
hematoma over the lumbar area of his back, an egglike bump on the back of his head, abrasions over his
buttocks and ruptured discs in his neck that required
fusion.
Upon the basis of this evidence, with the excep·
tion of some evidence going to a claimed loss of
4

income, which we shall mention later, the case was
submitted to the jury. The jury brought in a verdict
of "no cause of action." The plaintiff moved for a
new trial on the basis of a juror's misconduct, and in
support of said motion submitted affidavits of three
jurors and Kay Lewis who interviewed the jurors.
The motion was denied.
ARGUMENT
Point I.
The Trial Court Did Not Err In Denying The
Motion For New Trial Based On Jury Misconduct; There Being Neither Competent
Evidence Of Such Misconduct Nor A Showing of Prejudice To The Plaintiff's Case

The rule has been clearly announced in Utah
that jurors will not be allowed to impeach their own
verdict by affidavits, except where there has been
a chance verdict or where it is a result of bribery,
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 59(a) (2). Rule 59
allows jury misconduct as a ground for a new trial,
but does not allow such misconduct to be proved by
jurors' affidavits except in the two situations mentioned above. The cases in Utah have applied the
rule strictly.
In the early case of People v. Flynn, 75 Utah
378, 384, 26 Pac. 1114 (1891) the court declared:

"It is well settled that affidavits of jurors
will not· be ·received to impeach or question
their verdict, nor to show the grou~ up~
which it was rendered, nor to show their mis5

understanding of fact or law, nor that they
misunderstoo~ the charge of the court, or the
effec~ of then· verdict, nor their opinions,
surmises, and processes of reasoning in arriving at a verdict." (Emphasis ours)
And in Honier v. lntennountain Abstract Co.,
9 Utah 193, 33 Pac. 700 and Hepworth v. Covey
Bros. Aniusenient Co., 97 Utah 205, 91 Pac. (2d)
507 ( 1939) the affidavits of jurors as to their misconduct were not allowed in as evidence for a new
trial. The courts have not been hesitant to disallow
the affidavits even though the misconduct alleged
is of a serious nature. In Morrison v. Perry, 104
Utah 151, 140 Pac. ( 2d) 772 ( 1943) one juror called
to the attention of the other jurors that there was
insurance in the case. Four jurors submitted affidavits as to the discussion on insurance. The court
held that the affidavits were not competent because
of the statutory prohibition of their use except in
a chance verdict and bribery. And in Wheat v. Denver & R.G.W.R. Co., 122 Utah 418, 428, 250 Pac.
(2d) 932 (1952) one juror mentioned that a settlement offer had been made in the case, and discussed
another suit against the defendant. The court refused to allow affidavits or oral testimony of the
jurors. The court said:
" ... To permit litigants to get j~rors to
sign affidavits or testi~y to ma~ters dis~ussed
in connection with their functions as Jurors
would open the door t~ inq~i::Y into aJl matter
of things which a losmg htigant might con6

sider improper; misconceptions of evidence or
law, offers of settlement, personal experiences.
. . . Such post mortems would be productive
of no end of mischief and render service as a
juror unbearable." (Emphasis ours)
The court then held:
" ... Both the affidavits and oral testimony offered being incompetent, there exists
no basis for considering whether the jury was
in fact guilty of misconduct which would have
required the granting of a new trial." (Supra,
page 429)
Cases in other jurisdictions have also followed
this rule strictly. In Maffeo v. Holmes, 47 Cal. App.
(2d) 292, 117 Pac. (2d) 948 (1941) the factual
situation was similar to the case at bar. The defendant hit a pedestrian while driving at a slow
rate of speed with his lights on. The question of
lighting was a critical issue. Some of the jurors
visited the scene at the time of night that the accident occurred, in order to observe the lighting, and
they concluded that the plaintiff would have been
hidden by a shadow. This visit was discussed in
the jury room. Affidavits of jurors were taken
after the verdict went against the plaintiff. The
court strongly condemned the actions of the jury,
but said the affidavits were incompetent unless they
showed a chance verdict. The court gave this reasoning.
" ... and for the very good reason that
no juror can specifically establish that he
7

reached his verdict by reason of secret evi<;Ience of the locus in quo related by an erring
JUror and not by reason of the testimony of
the sworn witnesses, the arguments of counsel
the i?structio!1 of t~e court, or the legitimat~
suasions of his co-Jurors. The jury must be
presun!ed to have. done its dl;lty in re~ching
a verdict. . . . This presumption prevails except where proof authorized by the legislature
justifies the upsetting of the verdict." (Supra,
pages 951)
And in George 'V. City of Los Angeles, 51 Cal.
App. (2d) 311, 124 Pac. (2d) 872 and Wilson v.
Oklalwnw Ry. Co., 207 Okl. 204, 248 Pac. (2d) 1014
(1952) the courts refused to consider in motions for
new trials affidavits of the improper visits of jurors
to the scene of the accident. In the Wilson case the
court refused the juror's affidavits and oral testimony on the grounds that the verdict cannot be impeached by such means for misconduct within or
without the jury room.
The rule is thus clear - the affidavits of the
three jurors in this case are not competent evidence
to impeach their verdict, and thus serve as no basis
for establishing the alleged misconduct upon which
a new trial was predicated.
The affidavit of Kay Lewis is likewise incompetent evidence as it is merely hearsay of what the
jurors told him. In Glazier v. Crani, 71 Utah 465,
267 Pac. 188 ( 1928) the court said the affidavits
of third parties as to what jurors told them were
8

under the same rule as the affidavits of the jurors.
And in Herndon v. City of Seattle, 11 Wash. (2d)
88, 118 Pac. (2d) 421 (1941) the affidavit of one
juror that she heard another juror say he had visited
the scene of the accident was declared to be mere
hearsay and as such was insufficient to invoke the
discretion of the trial court to grant a new trial.
To the same effect is Tartacower v. New York City
Transit Authority, 169 N.Y.S. (2d) 695 (1957)
where it held that affidavits of other jurors and third
persons as to a juror's statement of an alleged view
of the scene were not competent proof to establish
misconduct. And in Kearns v. Hall, 91 S.E. (2d)
648, 197 Va. 736 (1956) the court adopts the same
position and cites numerous cases in support.
The affidavits of the jurors and Lewis are by
statute and public policy incompetent evidence of any
misconduct. There being no other evidence of the
alleged misconduct, the denial of a new trial on that
ground was clearly within the discretion of the trial
court.
However, even if there were competent evidence
of an improper view, the plaintiff has still failed
to show that he was so prejudiced thereby that the
trial court abused its discretion in refusing the motion for a new trial.
The mere assertion that a juror has misconducted himself is of little value. There must also
be proof that the misconduct was such that in light

of the facts of the case the verdict would have been
affected. Herndon v. City of Seattle, supra. The
rule to be applied here appears to be the same as
that applied in motions for mistrial. In Burton v.
Zion's Cooperative Merchantile Institution, 122 Utah
360, 249 Pac. (2d) 514 (1952) the court said a
mistrial should not be given if the court believes the
misconduct "probably did not prejudice" the moving
party. And once the mistrial is refused the appellate
court must let that decision stand "unless his determination appears to be so unreasonable that upon
review it appears that he was plainly wrong in that
there is a strong likelihood that the plaintiff could
not have had a fair trial," supra at page 365. And
the latitude granted the trial court is indicated in
Redd v. Airway Motor Coach Lines Inc., 104 Utah
9, 22, 137 Pac. (2d) 374 (1943). The court there
said
"In denying the motion for a new trial
on the ground of misconduct on the part of the
jury, the trial c~urt did not abuse i!s discretion, even assummg that on the showmg made
a contrary ruling could be sustained."
Thus, in showing prejudice to himself, the plaintiff
must show more than a mere possibility, Ison et al
v. Stewart, 105 Colo. 55, 94 Pac. (2d) 701 (1939).
He must show that the verdict was affected or reasonably would have been affected by the misconduct,
Saunders v. A. M. Williams Co., 62 Pac. (2d) 260,
155 Ore. 1 ( 1936). In this case neither one of those
criteria has been satisfied.
10

There is considerable doubt as to whether the
alleged misconduct could have added anything new
to the jury's understanding of the case. Merely taking a casual view of the scene, where there was no
dispute as to measurements, location of objects or
physical description, works no prejudice to the moving party.In Redd v. Airway Motor Coach Lines, Inc.,
supra, the jurors made measurements while taking
an authorized view of the scene. The court said the
fact that the jurors made certain measurements was
not prejudicial because there was no material dispute as to the measurements and thus their use
of the measurements in coming to a verdict was of
no consequence.
In the present case the alleged misconduct
of the juror Fuller in making a left hand turn onto
Rainbow Drive and accelerating up to 12-13 miles
per hour was not in any way prejudicial to the plaintiff. The plaintiff in the trial did not allege that the
defendant was exceeding 10 miles per hour. The
dispute was as to the time and space required to
stop, assuming a maximum speed of 10 miles per
hour. There is no allegation that the juror made any
skid tests, nor that he even stopped after he made the
left turn. The fact that the juror made a left turn
and found he couldn't go much over 10 to 15 miles
per hour up to the unmarked crosswalk was merely
cumulative upon a minor issue and did not go to the
material issues in the case - the point of impact
and the light conditions that night. If anything, the
11

test of the juror showed that the defendant could
have been going faster than he testified, and thus
any prejudice working from the misconduct would
be in the plaintiff's favor.
A case similar to the present situation is that
of Harden v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 112 N.W.
(2d) 324, 326, 253 Iowa 341 ( 1961). The case involved a car-train collision. The court found contributory negligence on the basis of skid marks and
testimony as to the speed that curves approaching
the crossing could be taken. Two jurors visited the
scene and negotiated the curves, testing at what
speeds they could be taken. In sustaining the trial
court's denial of a new trial on this ground, the
court said:
" ... The jurors found they could drive
it three to five miles an hour faster. This
matter was discussed by various jurors. While
we cannot approve of such practice and trial
courts should clearly inform jurors as to such
conduct, we are not prepared to say this
ground should have been sustained. It deals
with mere opinions as to what may be a safe
speed, and under the situation cannot so clearly be said to have reasonably influenced the
verdict, as to lead us to say the trial court
abused its discretion."
And in Herndon v. City of Seattle, supra, a juror
visited the scene of an intersection collision. The
trial court granted a new trial. This was reversed
on appeal. The court said that the short stop made
12

by the juror at the intersection brought nothing new
into the case, for there was no dispute as to physical
surroundings, visibility and measurements. The
court said that the bringing in of new evidence by a
juror must be shown with certainty in order to be
a basis for a new trial.
And in Jacob v. Miner, 67 Ariz. 109, 191 Pac.
(2d) 734 (1948) the court said that it was the conduct of the parties at the time of the accident which
was in issue, not the physical conditions. Thus prejudice to the defendant was not affirmatively probable and the denial of a new trial must be affirmed.
The alleged visit by juror Fuller added nothing
new to any material issue of the trial, and if anything
was added it was an implication of speed which could
only work to the plaintiff's advantage. There was
no basis for the trial court to find that prejudice
probably occurred, and the evidence is clearly insufficient to show that the trial court abused its
discretion.
But even if it be assumed that the verdict of
the juror Fuller was affected by the visit he allegedly
made, there still would be no prejudice to the plaintiff since the verdict was unanimous and only threefourths of the jurors need agree in order to constitute
a valid verdict in a civil case. Utah Constitution,
Article l, Section 10; Tartacower v. New York City
Transit Authority, supra.
13

The plaintiff is not entitled to a new trial on
the basis of jury misconduct for another reason failure to file an affidavit in support of such motion,
stating that he had no knowledge of the misconduct
before the jury retired. In Glazier v. Crani, supra,
the court held that the appellants could not validly
claim the right to a new trial where they had failed
to file such an affidavit. The court said:
" ... It is a general rule, subject to few
exceptions, that a motion for a new trial upon
this ground (juror misconduct) must be accompanied by affidavits showing that the misconduct complained of was not known to the
party moving for a new trial - or his counsel
- until after the case was submitted to the
jury."

The defendant submits, therefore, that the
plaintiff is not entitled to a new trial by reason of
any misconduct of the jury because no competent
evidence was submitted in support of such motion.
Even had there been competent evidence of misconconduct, the plaintiff has failed to show any prejudice to his case and has failed to file the necessary
affidavit that he had no knowledge of such alleged
misconduct before the jury retired.
POINT II.
The Trial Court Did Not Err In Giving An
Instruction On Unavoidable Accident.

The rule in Utah is clear: An instruction on
unavoidable accident may be given where there is
14

evidence that the accident occurred without the negligence of the parties involved. In Nelson v. Lott, 81
Utah 265, 17 Pac. (2d) 272 (1932) the defendant
struck the plaintiff with his car when the plaintiff
stepped out from the side of the road. The court
gave an instruction on unavoidable accident and the
defendant objected on the ground that the instruction contained words which indicated that an unavoidable accident could be caused by the defendant's
negligence. The court held that the instruction was
proper even though there were questions of negligence and contributory negligence.
In Denison v. Chapman, 6 Utah (2d) 379, 314
Pac. (2d) 838 ( 1957) the court sustained the instruction of unavoidable accident. There the car
of one defendant slid into the truck of the other
defendant, causing the truck to cross the center line,
colliding with the plaintiff. The court held that the
icy road was the proximate cause of the accident and
not the actions of the defendants. The court found
that the sliding of the car into the truck was not
due to the negligence of the driver but was due to the
conditions.
And of great significance in this appeal is the
case of Porter v. Price, 11 Utah (2d) 80, 355 Pac.
(2d) 66 (1960). There the court was faced with an
instruction identical to that given in the present
case, which is the instruction set out in Jury Instruction Forms, Utah, Section 16.1. There the defendant's car went out of control when he suffered a
15

diabetic insulin shock. The verdict was in the defendant's favor and the plaintiff appealed on the
basis that it was error to give the instruction on
unavoidable accident. The court held the instruction
to have been properly given, and drew an important
distinction in rejecting the case of Butigan v. Yellow
Cab Co., 49 Cal. (2d) 652, 320 Pac. (2d) 500 (1958).
The appellant there, as here, cited the Butigan case
for the proposition that it is error to give the instruction. The court distinguished the Butigan case on
these grounds:

". . . In that case there was substantial
evidence of negligence by the defendants, and
there was almost no affirmative evidence that
the accident resulted from any cause other
than those circumstances which were under
the control of an ordinary prudent man, yet
the jury decided for the defendant. The court •
stressed this inconsistency in deciding that the
instruction was prejudicial error, and such
inconsistency is not present in the instant case
Here, much of the evidence tended to show
circumstances beyond the control of a reasonable man and the jury decided accordingly.
Also, in the Butigan case, the instructions
themselves were misleading in suggesting to
the jury that they 'should consider unavoid·
ability as an issue or ground of defense sep·
arate and apart from the questions of negli·
gence and proximate causation.' Such con·
fusion is not apparent in the instruction here."
(Pages 82-83)
1G

The court then went on to lay down a test for when
the instruction was proper:
" ..• However, there are some situations
;vhere the evidence is ~usceptible of being so
mterpreted that an accident occurred without
negligence on the part of anyone, and if it
is reasonably susceptible of such interpretation, and a party requests it, the trial court
commits no error in so advising the jury."
(Emphasis ours, Page 84)
The rule in Utah then is that the instruction
will be allowed in circumstances where the evidence
is reasonably susceptible of being interpreted as
showing a lack of negligence on the parties involved.
The Butigan doctrine has thus been rejected in Utah,
as it has been in various other states. Ridgway National Bank v. North American Van Lines Inc., 326
Fed. (2d) 934 (CCA 3rd 1964); Panaro v. Cullen,
185 A. (2d) 889 (1962); Franco v. Fujimoto, 47
Hawaii 408, 390 Pac. (2d) 740 (1964); Hackworth
v. Davis, 87 Idaho 98, 390 Pac. (2d) 422 (1964).
It should, however, be noted that even some of the
California cases indicate doubt as to how far the
Butigan case really went. Rayner v. Ramirez, 159
Cal. App. (2d) 372, 324 Pac. (2d) 83 (1958); and
Emerton v. Acres, 160 Cal. App. (2d) 742, 325 Pac.
(2d) 685 (1958).
The great majority of states allow the unavoidable accident instruction to be given. In 65 A.L.R.
(2d) 24 it is stated that in most states the instruction
may be given in motor vehicle cases where the evi17

dence discloses facts supporting such instruction.
The note then cites 37 jurisdictions in support of that
statement . The note also mentions on page 23 that
the position taken by a few courts that do not allow
the instruction "will no doubt continue to be productive of numerous appeals concerning matters
not worth the attention, expense and risk they have
entailed."
The Utah rule, clearly allowing the instruction,
leaves one final question: Whether there was such
conclusive evidence of negligence in the present case
that the trial court abused its discretion in giving
the instruction. A review of the facts and cases similar to this situation shows that the court acted well
within the limits of its discretion. There is no evidence that the defendant acted negligently in any of
the sequence of events. He made a proper left turn
after the immediate traffic going north had cleared.
He had his lights on. He testified that he had looked
at the crosswalk area before he turned, and that he
saw nothing. His speed was well within the speed
limit - testified to by the defendant and his wife as
being less than 10 miles per hour. The defendant
was driving with his foot on the brake. The plaintiff points out that the defendant was negligent in
either not looking or not seeing what was there to
be seen, but this is merely a conclusion that the plaintiff could have been seen. The defendant must see
only that which a person acting reasonably under
the given conditions would have seen. The facts
18

here show that there was no lighting in the area
into which the defendant entered, that plaintiff was
dressed in a dark suit, and that due to the nature of
the turn defendant's lights may not have been focused
on the area of impact until just before it occurred.
The evidence seems easily susceptible of the interpretation that the defendant was not negligent.
There is also evidence that the plaintiff was
acting without negligence in that he said he was
walking in the crosswalk area and watching the
north-bound traffic due to his knowledge that the
traffic coming from the south often turned right
onto Rainbow Drive.
It thus is clear that the evidence was reasonably
susceptible of the interpretation that circumstances
beyond the control of the parties were responsible
for the accident, and not the acts of the parties.
The combined factors of darkness and the positions
of the parties created a situation which could reasonably be interpreted as the proximate cause of the
accident. This point is illustrated in cases with similar situations.
In Nelson v. Lott, supra, the accident took place
on a road leading into a rodeo ground from a highway. The plaintiff had parked his car on the
shoulder of the highway and walked down to the
ticket booth situated alongside the rodeo access road.
He saw the defendant's stopped car about a rod
away, facing the highway. He purchased his ticket
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and stepped into the road with his back to the defendant's car as he folded his money. He was then
struck by defendant's car. Witnesses said that the
plaintiff had stepped in front of defendant's car
so quickly that defendant had no time to stop. There
were definite issues of negligence as to the actions
of both parties, but the court also found that there
was sufficient evidence of no negligence that the
instruction was properly given.
In a recent New Mexico case the situation is
almost identical with the present case, Falkner v.
Martin, 74 N.M. 159, 391 Pac. (2d) 660 (1964).
There the plaintiff was struck at an intersection
one hour after sunset. There was a conflict of evidence as to whether she was in the crosswalk. The
defendant was going 15 to 18 miles per hour with
his lights on. There was no evidence that the plaintiff could have been seen by anyone in the car before
she was actually hit. The testimony was that she
"loomed in front of the car." The jury found no
cause of action. The plaintiff appealed, asserting
that it was error to give an instruction on unavoidable accident. The court affirmed the giving of the
instruction. The court said that the prior case of
Lucero v. Torres, 67 N.M. 10, 350 Pac. (2d) 1028
( 1960) had established the rule that there may be
due to the nature of the particular motor vehicle accident genuine questions of unavoidable accident. The
court then quoted from the Lucero case suggestions
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as to when such questions were raised:
. "A prominent feature may be one of surpr1~e~ sudden appearance and reasonably unantic1 pated presence of a pedestrian combined
with circumstances which present;, fair issue
as to whether the failure of the driver of a
motor vehicle to anticipate or sooner to guard
against the danger or to avoid it, is consistent
with a conclusion of the exercise of his due
care. In such cases the trial courts are inclined to grant the instruction on unavoidable
accident and their action in so doing is generally approved by the appellate courts." (Citations omitted, supra at 662)
The court then held that there were issues of negligence as to both parties, but that nevertheless there
was evidence of no negligence, thus warranting the
instruction on unavoidable accident.
The reasoning of the New Mexico case is consonant with the Utah view of the unavoidable accident instruction. Thus, under the facts of the present
case, which also indicate that the plaintiff "suddenly
loomed" in front of the defendant's car out of the
darkness, the only possible conclusion is that the
facts are reasonably susceptible to an interpretation
of no negligence. The giving of the instruction should
thus be affirmed.
POINT III.
The Court Properly Instructed The Jury To
Disregard The Alleged Losses Suffered By
Plaintiff's Business.
The law is very clear in disallowing proof of
business losses in a personal injury action where
21

the ~usiness loss is incapable of being proved directly
attributable to the injury. The general rule is stated
in 12 A.L.R. (2d) 296:

"It is a general rule that evidence of the
profits of a business in which the plaintiff in
a personal injury action is interested, which
depend for the most part upon the employment
of capital, the labor of others, or similar variable factors, is inadmissable in such an action
and cannot be considered for the purpose of
establishing the pecuniary value of lost time
or loss or diminution of earning capacity, for
the reasons that a loss of such profits is not
the necessary consequence of the plaintiff's
injury and that such profits are uncertain and
speculative."
This rule has been accepted in Utah. In Rosenthal v. Harker, 56 Utah 113, 189 Pac. 666 ( 1920)
the court found that the business losses suffered by
a junk dealer were properly considered in assessing
damages against the defendant. The court in so
holding clearly distinguished the situation from one
where the business was supported by invested capital
and labor of other persons. The court said on page
118:
" ... There was no attempt made to prove
profits realized from capital invested. In
fact, the testimony tends to show that :he
plaintiff had no appreciable amount of cap~tal
invested in the business conducted by him.
Therefore the profits proven, and of which
defendant complains, partook almost wholly
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of the nature of earnings realized by reason of
the personal efforts and labor of the plaintiff.
The authorities cited by counesl for defendant
hold and adhere to the well established doctrine and the general rule that profits of a
business should not be regarded as an element
of damages in this class of cases. . . . We remark that ordinarily the rule announced by
the cases cited and relied on is the proper one
to be followed. However under the facts and
circumstances of the present case, for the reasons heretofore stated, we think the admission
of the testimony and the instruction of the
court complained of by defendant was proper
and right. There was no appreciable capital
or investment in the business, and the profits
or earnings therefrom depend entirely on the
labor and personal efforts of plaintiff."
The present facts clearly indicate a situation
where the general rule does apply. Plaintiff Smith
was at the time of the accident one-third owner and
general manager of the Towne and Country Rambler
Corporation (R. 191). He claims that the $11,000
obligation which he undertook subsequent to the accident was a proper element of damages. But that
claim obviously cannot be sustained. First of all,
the Towne and Country Rambler Corporation was a
heavily capitalized corporation with an annual gross
of nearly a million dollars (R. 229). It employed
forty employees ( R. 231). It sold new and used cars,
and thus was in a market of considerable flux. These
facts alone are sufficient under the general rule to
exclude the use of its profits and losses and other
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business related expenditures in assessing damages
for plaintiff's personal injuries. See Shewry v. Hew·,
255 Iowa 147, 121 N.W. (2d) 529 (1963). It is
true that the plaintiff occupied an important position in the operation of the corporation, but the fact
that substantial capital and labor outside of his own
was being employed negates the direct link necessary
between the business fortunes and the plaintiff's
services. Under the rule of the Rosenthal case the
evidence was properly rejected.
However, there is also another reason for not
allowing the evidence as to the $11,000 obligation -there is no proof that the plaintiff in fact did suffer
any loss or impairment of his cash position. The
evidence was somewhat confusing, but it appeared
that the plaintiff acquired the other two-thirds stock
in the corporation and gave in consideration the note
for $11,000. He thus suffered no loss on that trans·
action. He then transferred the stock to a man
named Bostrom in exchange for Bostrom's promise
to make available to the Corporation $55,000.00,
$20,000 of which he soon paid to the Corporation
( R. 249). The testimony indicates that the Corpora·
tion was in financial trouble even before the accident
(R. 262), that there had been large net losses from•
September, 1962 through December of that year (R.
231) and that the cash position on the 1st of Decem·
ber was poor, with only $766 in the bank (R. 242).
The $20,000 paid in by Bostrom helped the cash
position of the Corporation, and by February sub·
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stantial profits were being shown by the Corporation (R. 233) and total liabilities were reduced (R.
234). Plaintiff said they were back on their feet
by March (R. 244). The total sales in 1963 were
above 1962 (R. 237) and plaintiff testified that he
made more money in 1963 than he did in 1962 (R.
237). The evidence submitted was highly speculative
as to whether there ever was a loss on the $11,000
obligation. It could have resulted in a profit to
plaintiff due to its life saving effect upon the Corporation. And the evidence was not clear as to
whether the obligation was in fact upon the Corporation and not the plaintiff.
Under the facts presented the plaintiff could
not even prove a loss had occurred as well as show
that the loss was directly attributable to his injury.
The facts negate both propositions. Thus, the ruling
of the trial court that the claim of loss was too
speculative or remote was proper under the facts
and the law.
The plaintiff also makes the novel argument
that the striking of evidence by Instruction No. 10
is prejudicial error because it lends undue emphasis
to the defendant. However, the general rule is that
an instruction should be used in order to prevent
prejudice upon the party moving for the evidence to
be stricken. The rule is stated in 53 Am. Jur., Trial,
Section 671, page 518:
"In like manner, where evidence is admitted upon the theory that its relevancy may
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be subsequently shown by other evidence and
such evidence is not introduced the ~ourt
should exclude the irrelevant evidence on its
own motion and instruct the jury to disregard
it."
The facts in this case show that if any prejudice
was worked, it \Vas upon the defendant by the allowance of extensive testimony as to the alleged business
loss of the plaintiff. The evidence was allowed in
with the condition that if it was not tied up later
the court would entertain a motion to strike (R
203). Thus, when it was not tied up, the court was
obligated to strike it by an instruction to the jury.
It appears that if every time the court strikes
evidence by an instruction it is construed to mean
that is disbelieves that party's case not only would
the court's powers be stifled but great prejudices
would be worked upon the moving party. The court
gave the benefit of the doubt to the plaintiff in allow·
ing the evidence. The plaintiff, therefore, has no
right to the benefit of the doubt when the evidence
is stricken. Giving an instruction is the only equit·
able means to strike evidence allowed in with the
condition that it be tied up later. The defendant
had a right to have the jury clearly instructed that
the evidence was not to be considered. And the plain·
tiff's fear that the jury may think the judge does
not believe the evidence is a hazard endured by both
parties whenever the court rules, and clearly is not
error.
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POINT IV.
The Instructions To The Jury When Read
As A Whole Were Not Prejudicial To The
Plaintiff.

The plaintiff in Point 4 of his Brief points out
that the instructions over-emphasized the defendant's case, but he supports that assertion with what
seems to be an objection to the chronological order
of the instructions and not their content. It has
been clearly pointed out in a recent case that the
instructions must be considered as a whole, and the
fact that a supplemental instruction is given on
contributory negligence does not mean that undue
emphasis is to be implied to the plaintiff's detriment.
Hill v. Cloward, 14 Utah (2d) 55, 377 Pac. (2d)
186 (1962). The fact that the instructions dealing
with the duties of defendant were given last is not
in and of itself material. If the instructions adequately expressed the law of the case and were not
given in such a way as to mislead the jury they
are adequate and further inquiry is not warranted.
53 Am. Jur., Trial, Section 561, page 445.
The instructions were arranged in what seems
to be the most logical fashion, with statements of
the general duties and definitions preceding the instructions on specific duties under the evidence. The
plaintiff doesn't point out any error of law in the
instructions nor any repetition of a particular point.
The crux of the objection comes down to the fact that
the duties of the plaintiff were defined before those
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of the defendant. This clearly is no basis for prejudicial error.
POINT V.
The Court Properly Refused To Give Plaintiff's Requested Instruction Number 6 That Defendant Was Negligent As A Matter
Of Law In Failing To Keep A Proper Lookout.

The plaintiff seems to have greatly over-simplified the proposition when he states in his Brief at
page 25, under Point 5, "that if a person fails to
keep a proper lookout, he is negligent as a matter of
law." That proposition assumes the critical issue
- whether or not the defendant under these particular circumstances acted unreasonably in keeping
a lookout. The only practical approach, therefore,
is that taken in Covington v. Carpenter, 4 Utah (2d)
378, 381, 294 Pac. (2d) 788 (1956) where the court
said that in most cases the question should be sub·
mitted to the jury to determine whether the defend·
ant kept a proper lookout. The court laid down this
rule:
" ... Modern traffic complexities make it
impossible to lay down by judicial rule what
will always be, or fail to be, reasonable care
in the operation of motor vehicles. The duty
to keep a proper lookout is manifest but the
obedience to or violation of that duty must be
determined according to particular circum·
stances .and in full accord with the constantly
varying exigencies occasioning each acciden~.
As to what constitutes a proper lookout is
usually, therefore, a la~ter-day classi~ ques·
tion for jury determinat10n, and each trial and
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appellate court must determine the question
as a matter of law only when convinced that
reasonabl~ persons could not disagree upon
the quest10n when conscientiously applying
fact to law."
Under that test the facts of this case clearly
call for a jury determination of whether defendant or
plaintiff was guilty of an improper lookout. In
Charvoz v. Cottrell, 12 Utah (2d) 25, 28, 361 Pac.
(2d) 516 (1961) the fact situation was very similar
to the present case. There the deceased was in the
marked crosswalk, crossing the street at night. The
lighting around the intersection was dim and the
backdrop was dark. The road was black-top and
the deceased was wearing dark clothing. The defendant was driving at 30 miles per hour with his
lights on. He applied his brakes as soon as he saw the
deceased, but it was too late. The court held:
" ... Therefore, although the evidence is
undisputed that the defendant could have
stopped his car in time to avoid the accident
had he seen the deceased at a distance of 100
feet, the circumstances are such as to create
a doubt in the minds of reasonable men as to
defendant's ability to observ~ the dec~dent
at that distance and hence the issue of failure
to keep a proper lookout was for the jury."
In the present case the general condition of
darkness and the fact that defendant was in the process of turning so that his headlights were not directed into Rainbow Drive until the vehicle had substantially completed its turn are easily sufficient to
raise a question in the minds of reasonable men as
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to whether defendant should, in the exercise of rea.
sonable care, have seen the plaintiff sooner than
he did. Thus the question was properly submitted to
the jury.
Point VI.
The Court Properly Refused To Give Plaintiff's Requested Instruction Number 1 That The Defendant Be Found Negligent As
A Matter Of Law.

The law is extremely clear on this point. If
fair minded men could draw different conclusions
from the evidence, the issue of negligence is for the
jury. In the present case the evidence of the plaintiff is not as believable as that of the defendant.
The defendant and his wife testified that the impact
was outside the crosswalk area and that they stopped
within 2 to 3 feet. The front of the car was 15 feet 7
inches east from the center of the unmarked cross·
walk. Officer Katulas testified that had the defendant been going only 5 miles per hour, as the
defendant testified, he could have stopped in approx·
imately 31/2 feet ( R. 299). Thus this evidence puts
the place of impact well outside the unmarked cross·
walk area. Both parties concede that there was no
lighting in the immediate area and both claimed not !
to have seen the other until just before impact. Plain·
tiff's testimony was that he was in the crosswalk
area, but that he was looking south and not at the
left turn lane. This evidence clearly offers a direct
issue as to negligence. The situation is similar to that
1

1
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in Charvoz v. Cottrell, supra. There the court said:
"Certainly, if there is a conflict in the
evidence, the question of negligence is not one
?flaw, but one of fact to be determined by the
Jury. However, even if the facts are undisp~ted, if fair-mi~ded men can honestly draw
different conclus10ns from them the issue of
negligence should be settled by a jury. In
other words, negligence is a question for the
jury unless all reasonable men must draw the
same conclusion from the facts as they are
shown." (Page 27)
All reasonable men could hardly come to the
same conclusion under the facts here. The instruction
was, therefore, properly denied.
CONCLUSION
There is no basis for a new trial upon the
grounds raised by the plaintiff. The facts of this
case, even read in a light most favorable to the
plaintiff, clearly show evidence that this accident
may well have been unavoidable on the part of either
party. This court has made it clear that an instruction to that effect is proper where evidence susceptible of such interpretation is present. Likewise, the
evidence presents closely drawn issues as to the negligence of both parties. The assertion that these
issues could have been decided as a matter of law are
patently without merit.
The judgment of the trial court in the arrangement and choice of instructions was well within
its discretion. The plaintiff failed to present any
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evidence or law to support his allegation that prejudice resulted from the striking of the confusing
and speculative evidence of business loss and from
the method of arranging the instructions. The business of the courts would be unjustifiably interrupted
if such actions by the court were deemed prejudicial.
The issue of misconduct was not properly presented
before the trial court. In the absence of competent
evidence of misconduct there is no basis for a new
trial, and even if there had been competent evidence
there is no showing that the plaintiff was in any
way prejudiced.
vVe respectfully submit that the new trial was
properly denied, there being no showing by the plain·
tiff of any basis under Utah law or the facts of this
case justifying a new trial.
Respectfully submitted
DON J. HANSON
Hanson & Garrett
520 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Defendant
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